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New Zealand’s Living Standards Framework  
On the question of how we ought to measure national well-being, the name of Amartya 
Sen is ever-present. This is not because 
his capability approach is the standard 
approach for well-being frameworks. 
On the contrary, Sen’s philosophically 
sophisticated vision poses well-known 
challenges for operationalisation (Sugden, 
1993; Alkire, 2002, pp.181–93). His ever-
presence, I suspect, hangs more on his 
eloquence, his ample humanism, and his 
appeal to a liberal sensibility that hasn’t yet 
deserted our age entirely. As Sen puts it, his 
approach supports ‘the expansion of the 
“capabilities” of persons to lead the kind of 
lives they value – and have reason to value’ 
(Sen, 1999, p.18). 
In 2018, when the current government 
accelerated Treasury’s work to develop the 
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what might 
Amartya Sen say?
Within the general notion of the living standard, divergent and rival views of the 
goodness of life co-exist in an unsorted bundle … You could be well off, without 
being well. You could be well, without being able to lead the life you wanted. You 
could have got the life you wanted, without being happy. You could be happy, 
without having much freedom. You could have a good deal of freedom, without 
achieving much. We can go on. 
Amartya Sen, The Standard of Living (1987), p.1
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Living Standards Framework (henceforth 
LSF), Sen’s approach was favourably 
echoed by the secretary of the Treasury, 
Gabriel Makhlouf (Makhlouf, 2018), and 
by the minister of finance, Grant Robertson, 
in his opening address to the Third 
International Conference on Wellbeing and 
Public Policy in Wellington (Robertson, 
2018). Sen is also cited in recent 
publications on well-being economics in 
the New Zealand context (Dalziel and 
Saunders, 2014, 2015; Fry and Wilson, 
2018). This affirms that the capability – for 
all its complications – is a compelling ideal. 
Treasury has acknowledged this 
inheritance, both in the original LSF 
working paper, which discusses Sen’s 
capability approach, and in the first 
iteration of the LSF Dashboard, released in 
December 2018 (Treasury, 2011, pp.11–13; 
2018, p.8). Notably, however, among the 11 
discussion papers produced by Treasury in 
2018, only one mentions Sen at all.1 This 
begs the question of the extent to which 
Sen’s ideas have directly influenced the 
design of the LSF.
In this article I explore the LSF’s 
relationship to Sen’s legacy. This is not 
because I think that Sen’s capability 
approach ought to be followed to the 
letter.2 Nor should I be misconstrued as an 
unqualified defender of Sen and his 
capability approach, because I am not (for 
critical perspectives, see Navarro, 2000; 
Hartley, 2009; Feldman, 2010, contra 
Deneulin, 2014). Nevertheless, I do believe 
that Sen’s account warrants revisiting, 
because it shines a light on a variety of 
useful distinctions and humanistic 
concerns that ought to weigh on the minds 
of those designing and utilising any well-
being framework. And it is in the utilisation 
of the LSF that the idea of the capability is 
potentially most relevant, as a way of 
interpreting the LSF Dashboard and 
making sense of its indicators. As such, the 
contribution of Sen’s thinking might be 
still to come, as an instrument for astute 
political judgement. But let us begin with 
an overview of the capability approach and 
its relationship to the LSF.
The capability approach
The basic units of Sen’s capability approach 
are functionings (see Figure 1). In Sen’s 
words: ‘Functionings represent parts of the 
state of a person – in particular the various 
things that he or she manages to do or be 
in leading a life’ (Sen, 1993, p.31). 
The capability is a more complex 
object. First, it is a potentiality: the 
capability is about the opportunity to do 
or be something, not the doing or being 
itself. As Sen parses the distinction: ‘A 
functioning is an achievement, whereas a 
capability is the ability to achieve’ (Sen, 
1987, p.36). Second, capabilities are 
composites of multiple functionings, 
which together contribute to a person’s 
opportunity to achieve a particular 
outcome. For example, if we wish to assess 
a person’s capability to achieve a tertiary 
education, a wide range of functionings 
are relevant, which might include early 
education, family income, social mobility, 
mental well-being, and so on. Looking at 
a person’s tertiary education achievements 
alone won’t tell us about her capability, 
because many people who possess this 
capability may freely choose not to pursue 
tertiary education. 
As such, the capability intermingles 
with the idea of freedom. Indeed, Sen even 
uses the phrase ‘substantive freedoms’ as a 
synonym for capabilities (Sen, 1999, pp.36, 
74). Freedom contributes to well-being 
because it enables people to make the 
choices that contribute to their life going 
well, but also because acting freely is itself 
constitutive of well-being (Sen, 1993, p.39). 
Yet Sen also treats well-being as only one 
of many possible agency goals that we may 
choose to pursue (Sen, 1984, pp.186–7). 
Other such goals – especially ‘those relating 
to fulfilling obligations’ (p.187) – may be 
indifferent or even inimical to well-being, 
such as a life of ascetic sacrifice, national 
duty or religious devotion. Our capability 
set should provide us with the opportunity 
to improve our well-being, but a capability 
approach does not dictate this goal, no 
more than it dictates any particular 
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functioning as mandatory. Consequently, 
freedom has a certain centrality in Sen’s 
theory, even a priority over well-being.
Finally, Sen notes that this configuration 
of functionings, capabilities and agency 
goals resides within an evaluative space. By 
this, he refers to exercises of reasoning 
which identify objects of value, especially 
the functionings and capabilities that are 
most relevant to our purposes, such as the 
analysis of well-being or living standards 
(Sen, 1993, p.32). Sen strongly endorses 
democratic forms of public reasoning as 
appropriate (Sen, 1999, pp.76–81, 146–59, 
2009, pp.321–54).
Now, how does this compare to the 
LSF? The LSF advances three dimensions 
of intergenerational well-being: current 
well-being, future well-being, and risk and 
resilience. Current well-being is organised 
into 12 domains, each of which incorporates 
multiple indicators. The domains are: (1) 
civic engagement and governance, (2) 
cultural identity, (3) environment, (4) 
health, (5) housing, (6) income and 
consumption, (7) jobs and earnings, (8) 
knowledge and skills, (9) safety, (10) social 
connections, (11) subjective well-being and 
(12) time use. Future well-being is 
organised into the four capitals – (1) 
natural capital, (2) financial and physical 
capital, (3) human capital and (4) social 
capital – which ‘generate well-being, both 
now and into the future’ (Treasury, 2018, 
p.6). Finally, there is a third dimension, risk 
and resilience, which conceives of ‘the 
ability of our people and the country to 
withstand shocks’ (ibid.).
It is worth noting that this structure 
does not derive directly from Sen’s 
philosophical framework, but rather more 
directly from the OECD’s How’s Life? 
framework (OECD, 2013), which in turn 
is strongly indebted to the report by the 
Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic Performance and Social Progress, 
chaired by Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Amartya Sen 
and Joseph Stiglitz. The capability approach 
is acknowledged in both (OECD, 2013, 
p.22; Fitoussi, Sen and Stiglitz, 2009, 
pp.151–3) – unsurprising given Sen’s 
involvement in the latter – but it is not the 
only methodological input. The Fitoussi–
Sen–Stiglitz commission recommends that 
quality of life be defined in terms of 
capabilities as well as subjective well-being 
and the notion of fair allocations as derived 
from welfare economics (Fitoussi, Sen and 
Stiglitz, 2009, pp.145–56). It regards the 
selection of elements from among these 
three approaches as a matter of ‘normative 
decision’ (ibid., p.155). It also recommends 
that quality of life is not compressed into 
a single metric, not least to capture the 
issue of sustainability. Rather, a distinction 
should be made between instantaneous 
well-being at a single moment and global 
well-being over time (ibid., pp.251–3). 
Consequently, the Fitoussi–Sen–Stiglitz 
commission recommends a stock-based 
approach, which conceives of intertemporal 
sustainability in terms of a ‘stock’, ‘wealth’, 
‘asset’ or ‘capital’ (ibid., p.250). This 
approach was adopted by the LSF in its 
original presentation of the four capitals 
(Treasury, 2011, pp.17–27), as well as by 
the OECD’s How’s Life? framework (OECD, 
2013, p.199). 
None of this is inconsistent with Sen’s 
argumentation, because he argues that 
capabilities ought not to be regarded as a 
substitute for utilitarian and welfarist 
metrics, but rather as a complement that 
captures real aspects of well-being that 
these other metrics neglect (Sen, 1979, 
1987, pp.1–19). Moreover, the LSF’s own 
evolution since 2011 has shifted it in a 
direction that better aligns with Sen’s ideal. 
The inclusion of the 12 domains of current 
well-being – in addition to the four capitals 
of future well-being – better aligns the LSF 
not only with the basic structure of the 
OECD’s How’s Life? framework, but also 
with Sen’s insistence that ‘The value of the 
living standard lies in the living’ (Sen, 1987, 
p.25). That is, the foremost concern for 
social measurement is the quality of life 
that people actually lead, whereas 
instrumental factors like income have 
derivative relevance.
The other notable shift is from the LSF’s 
eponymous focus on living standards to 
well-being. Originally, the objective of the 
LSF was to enable Treasury’s vision of 
‘working towards higher living standards 
for New Zealanders’ (Treasury, 2011, p.6). 
Yet when Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern 
announced that her government would 
‘accelerate’ the development of the LSF, she 
announced ‘a tool and framework that will 
make the well-being of our people a measure 
of our economic success’ (Ardern, 2018, 
emphasis added). On Sen’s account, this is 
not merely a change in terminology, but a 
substantive change in objectives. He 
conceives of living standards in terms of 
self-regarding achievements: that is, aspects 
of the nature of the life that a person is 
living. The idea of well-being includes this, 
but also other-regarding achievements, 
which includes the nature of lives that 
other people are living. In this vein, Sen 
writes: ‘one’s misery at the sorrow of 
another certainly does reduce ceteris 
paribus one’s well-being, but in itself this 
is not a reduction in the person’s standard 
of living’ (Sen, 1987, p.27). 
The clearest example of an other-
regarding concern in the LSF is the 
inclusion of the suicide rate. Only those 
most emotionally and financially reliant 
on a person who dies by suicide, such as 
family and close friends, are likely to have 
their standard of living affected. 
Nevertheless, much wider networks of 
people can have their well-being affected, 
... when Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern 
announced that her government would 
‘accelerate’ the development of the 
[Living Standards Framework], she 
announced ‘a tool and framework that 
will make the well-being of our people a 
measure of our economic success’... 
New Zealand’s Living Standards Framework: what might Amartya Sen say?
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because they are touched by the suffering 
of the person who died, or by the impacts 
on friends and family. More broadly still, 
we can argue that our collective well-being 
is undermined by New Zealand’s 
comparatively high suicide rate, because 
this is ‘a national shame’ that touches us 
all.3 So, by including this indicator, the LSF 
moves beyond living standards into the 
realm of well-being. Moreover, there are 
opportunities to enrich this other-
regarding aspect in future iterations of the 
LSF, not least by incorporating specific 
proposals from Treasury’s discussion 
papers. For example, a Pacific perspective 
emphasises the importance of perceived 
familial well-being and perceived social 
well-being (Thomsen, Tavita and Levi-Teu, 
2018), which are distinctive from subjective 
well-being by being explicitly other-
regarding.4
So, there are affinities between the LSF 
and Sen’s philosophical ideal. Well-being 
is identified as an attractively rich goal. We 
also see a range of indicators to capture 
the well-being achievements, the various 
‘beings’ and ‘doings’, that reflect present 
well-being, and that might sustain well-
being into the future. However, at the 
mezzanine level of figure 1, between the 
basic level of the functionings and the 
high level of agency goals, there are two 
points of difference: first, the interpretive 
focus on capitals rather than capabilities; 
and second, the apparent absence of 
freedom in the LSF. 
Capitals not capabilities
If the LSF follows the OECD’s How’s Life 
framework, then it invites us to interpret 
the domains of current well-being in 
terms of capabilities, as opportunities 
that New Zealanders presently possess 
or lack. However, in regards to future 
well-being, the composite concept for 
multiple functionings is capital rather than 
capability.
In a paper that discusses the capital/
capability distinction, Sen argues that these 
‘two perspectives are … closely related but 
distinct’. He defines human capability in 
familiar terms as ‘the ability of human 
beings to lead lives they have reason to 
value and to enhance the substantive 
choices they have’. But he defines human 
capital as ‘the agency of human beings – 
through skill and knowledge as well as 
effort – in augmenting production 
possibilities’ (Sen, 1997, p.1959). 
In short, the idea of capital is 
instrumentalist: it is a means to serve 
economic ends. Sen elaborates in terms of 
value. On his account, human capital 
captures the indirect value that is realised 
through economic properties such as 
production, price and innovation. By 
contrast, the idea of human capability also 
captures the direct value that enriches the 
life of the person who possesses the 
capability. 
Consider the example of education. As 
noted by the Treasury discussion paper on 
human capital, education and skill levels 
are central to measuring ‘the productive 
wealth embodied in people’, because 
‘qualifications and labour market earnings 
are highly correlated’ (Morrissey, 2018, p.7). 
Education creates indirect value by 
augmenting the value of production in the 
national economy. However, education 
also delivers direct value to people – ‘in 
reading, communicating, arguing, in being 
able to choose in a more informed way, in 
being taken more seriously by others, and 
so on’ (Sen, 1997, p.1959) – which may not 
have a straightforward relationship to 
economic production. 
With characteristic courtesy, Sen 
describes the uptake of the idea of human 
capital as ‘certainly an enriching move’, yet 
he adds that ‘it needs supplementation … 
because human beings are not merely 
means of production (even though they 
excel in that capacity), but also the end of 
the exercise’ (ibid., p.1960). This 
admonishment is relatively mild by 
comparison with other critiques of human, 
social and natural capital (for example, 
Mabey, Skinner and Clark, 1998; Spash and 
Vatn, 2006; Knorringa and van Staveren, 
2007; Sullivan, 2018), yet Sen belongs in 
their company by worrying about capital’s 
instrumentalist implications. His advocacy 
of human capability instead of human 
capital is an attempt to forestall this 
instrumentalism.
Certainly, there is no methodological 
prohibition against such a move. When the 
Sustainability subgroup of the Fitoussi–
Sen–Stiglitz commission recommends 
taking a stock-based approach to 
sustainability, it acknowledges the 
normative uncertainty that remains: ‘There 
as many [sic] evaluations of the 
sustainability of well-being as there can be 
definitions of what current well-being is’ 
(Fitoussi, Sen and Stiglitz, 2009, p.258). 
Consequently, the Sustainability subgroup 
defers to the Quality of Life subgroup on 
the normative choice over ‘what we are 
trying to sustain’ (ibid., p.261). As discussed 
earlier, this subgroup recommends a focus 
on capabilities, subjective well-being and 
fair allocations. Sen clearly regards this 
inclusion of capabilities as advantageous, 
because it ensures that considerations of 
direct value are not lost from the exercise 
of deriving policy relevance from indicators 
With characteristic courtesy, Sen 
describes the uptake of the idea 
of human capital as ‘certainly an 
enriching move’, yet he adds that ‘it 
needs supplementation … because 
human beings are not merely means of 
production (even though they excel in 
that capacity), but also the end of the 
exercise’... 
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of stocks (Sen, 1997), and that the 
expansion or retraction of freedoms is 
regarded as a concern for sustainability 
(Sen, 2009, pp.248–52).
However, Sen further suggests that the 
idea of capital is not destined to be 
instrumentalist. On the issue of direct and 
indirect values, he notes: ‘The human 
capital perspective can – in principle – be 
defined very broadly to cover both types of 
valuation, but it is typically defined – by 
convention – primarily in terms of indirect 
value: human qualities that can be 
employed as “capital” in production in the 
way physical capital is’ (Sen, 1997, p.1959, 
emphasis added). In other words, the 
instrumentalism of human capital is a 
matter of convention rather than essence. 
Notably, the OECD interprets human 
capital in this broader sense, by highlighting 
its links to current well-being through its 
‘essential input to economic production 
and income generation’ as well as 
‘intrinsically valuable well-being outcomes’ 
(OECD, 2013, p.186). The LSF’s four 
capitals might be interpreted in this way, 
without needing to invoke the language of 
capability.
So, in the same way that Sen shows how 
education provides direct value for people, 
the same manouevre is possible for the 
LSF’s other human capital indicators. For 
example, a decline in non-communicable 
diseases creates indirect value for the 
economy, because healthy workforces are 
productive workforces. But it also creates 
direct value for people who avoid the 
incommodity, fear and suffering that such 
diseases may entail. Both lines of evaluation 
are implicit within this indicator, so the 
choice of interpretive approach will 
influence how broadly this value is 
conceived. If policymakers take a narrow 
capital approach, they might only care 
about the interdependencies between 
human capital and financial and physical 
capital, or the ‘income and consumption’ 
and ‘jobs and earnings’ domains in current 
well-being. However, if policymakers 
conceive of capital more broadly (or switch 
to a capability lens), then they are 
encouraged to acknowledge the 
interdependencies between non-
communicable diseases and various aspects 
of personal well-being – including ‘health’ 
and ‘subjective well-being’ within current 
well-being – thereby averting the 
instrumentalist critique.
The same goes for the social capital 
indicators (‘trust held in others’, ‘perceived 
corruption’, ‘discrimination’, ‘trust in 
government institutions’ and ‘sense of 
belonging’). To be free from mistrust, to be 
spared from the frustrations and paranoia 
that corruption induces, to live without the 
misery of discrimination and arbitrary 
domination, to enjoy institutional integrity 
and transparency, to feel like one belongs 
and has standing in a community – these 
are all forms of direct value that accrue to 
people and improve their personal well-
being. Yet these indicators also generate 
indirect value for social and governmental 
institutions by ‘better economic and 
democratic performance, better 
educational outcomes and a healthier and 
safer society’ (Frieling, 2018, p.6). What is 
at stake is how policymakers interpret the 
indicators of social capital (and indeed 
natural capital),5 either as instrumental to 
existing social and economic structures, or 
as constituent elements for sustaining the 
freedoms and capabilities of present and 
future peoples.
The question is whether the four 
capitals framework – by dint of linguistic 
convention – can permit this broader 
conception of value, or whether decision 
makers will invariably lapse back to the 
instrumentalist understandings of capital 
that so readily spring to mind. Some argue 
that these associations are undisplaceable, 
because the idea of capital is entangled in 
larger ideational structures that make such 
meanings irresistible (Moore and Patel, 
2018, p.26). Perhaps anticipating this line 
of critique, the Fitoussi–Sen–Stiglitz 
commission notes that ‘stock’, ‘wealth’, ‘asset’ 
and ‘capital’ are viable alternatives, even 
registering its own preference for ‘the more 
neutral term of wealth’ (Fitoussi, Sen and 
Stiglitz, 2009, pp.250, 266). And while Sen 
recommends that capability not be 
neglected, this term is not without its 
ambiguities; nor is Sen entirely in control 
of its usage by relevant linguistic 
communities (Deneulin, 2014). This points 
to the significant interpretive work that 
remains to be done, which I revisit in the 
final section. 
What about freedom?
The second divergence between the LSF 
and the capability approach is the absence 
of freedom and, hence, what appears to 
be the absence of capabilities, properly 
conceived. Nowhere in the LSF is freedom 
accorded the primacy that Sen accords it. 
In its original iteration, the LSF highlights 
that ‘freedoms, rights and capabilities’ are 
important for higher living standards 
(Treasury, 2011, pp.16–17), yet this 
dissipates throughout the development of 
the LSF Dashboard. 
So I begin this section by exploring a 
strong conclusion – too strong – that the 
LSF is simply not a capabilities approach, 
at least not in the formal Sennian sense. 
However, because this conclusion only 
holds weakly, I will eventually deliver the 
reader to an alternative conclusion: that the 
ideas of freedom and capability are implicit 
or unrealised in the LSF Dashboard, and 
hence an unresolved matter of interpretive 
choice.
But first, let us say, in strong terms, that 
the LSF is not a capability approach. It is 
informed by such an approach, but is not 
itself such an approach, at least as Sen 
defines it, because it focuses on functionings 
rather than capabilities. It measures 
achievements but not the opportunity to 
... how does a government distinguish 
between a person who lacks the 
capability to enter tertiary education and 
a person who possesses the capability 
but chooses not to use it?
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achieve. If true, does this actually matter? 
After all, the capability is an elusive, if not 
impossible, thing to quantify. For example, 
how does a government distinguish 
between a person who lacks the capability 
to enter tertiary education and a person 
who possesses the capability but chooses 
not to use it? While some such factors may 
be simple enough to measure (such as 
enrolment criteria and debt burden), other 
factors may be invisible even to the person 
making a choice about their education 
(such as feelings of personal inadequacy). 
On the flipside, the study of 
functionings, of actual achievements, can 
take policymakers quite far. It is an ongoing 
debate among Sen scholars as to whether 
functionings or capabilities should be the 
focus, or some combination of both (for 
discussion, see Robeyns, 2017, pp.107–12). 
In particular instances, an analysis of 
capabilities is not only unnecessary, but 
inappropriate. If we are concerned with the 
well-being of children or the severely 
cognitively disabled, for example, then our 
analysis ought to focus on functionings 
rather than capabilities, because it isn’t 
appropriate to burden children or the 
severely cognitively disabled with the full 
responsibilities of choice. Still other 
achievements, such as safety from violence, 
ought to be provided absolutely to adults 
as well as children. To frame non-violence 
in terms of capability, as if the state is only 
obliged to provide its citizens with 
opportunities for a non-violent life, is 
clearly inadequate. 
For these issues, a level of paternalism 
is generally accepted. But there are other 
aspects of contemporary life where (at least 
under the expectations of liberalism) it is 
not appropriate or effective for a 
government to determine the life that 
people ought to lead. In such instances, the 
capability is an appropriate place for a 
government to land. 
Consider the issue of childcare. If a 
government is focused on the achievement 
of a certain outcome – say, gender parity, 
or a specific ratio of childcare among men 
and women – then it faces manifold 
considerations. Is the mother suffering 
from postnatal complications that require 
extended leave? Does the mother intend to 
breastfeed or bottle-feed? Is the infant able 
to breastfeed or bottle-feed? Does either 
parent prefer to be primary carer? Is either 
parent incapable of fulfilling the role of 
carer? What are the expectations of the 
extended family and community? Are 
gender pay inequities driving a 
correspondingly unequal distribution of 
childcare? Do the parents’ respective 
employers permit flexible or part-time 
working hours? Does the family have access 
to childcare? Each family tracks a unique 
course through these and other 
considerations, influenced by a range of 
factors, which might include personality, 
education, religious and cultural values, 
personal and family finances, and so on. In 
this nuanced space, government 
paternalism is an extremely blunt tool. Yet 
by focusing on capabilities, a government 
is encouraged to focus on resources and 
social arrangements that might support 
diverse forms of family life. These could 
include access to childcare facilities, paid 
parental leave, gender pay equity, provision 
of pre- and post-natal support services, 
education on reproductive health and 
parenting, and so on.
In The Idea of Justice, Sen is very clear 
about what his capabilities approach does 
and does not do. He writes that ‘the 
capability approach points to an 
informational focus in judging and 
comparing overall individual advantages, 
and does not, on its own, propose any 
specific formula about how that 
information may be used’, nor any ‘specific 
formula for policy decisions’ (Sen, 2009, 
p.232). This open-endedness could be 
regarded as a shortcoming, but it also 
means that the capability approach is 
amenable to a variety of normative 
positions, whether a conception of the 
good, a theory of justice, or some other 
ethical framework. In Sen’s words, it ‘is, in 
fact, no more than a perspective in terms 
of which the advantages and disadvantages 
of a person can be reasonably assessed’ 
(ibid., pp.296–7). 
Which brings us to the more viable 
conclusion: that the idea of the capability 
isn’t so much absent from the LSF as it is 
underdetermined, one of several ways to 
organise the information that the LSF 
Dashboard conveys. This is not a bad thing, 
because, as I argued earlier, there are 
instances where a capability lens would be 
inappropriate. However, in some instances 
the capability is a desirable lens, because it 
directs policymakers to empower citizens 
to lead the lives that they have reason to 
value, rather than lives that accord with 
policymakers’ own prescriptions.  
Capability as an interpretive framework
The capability ought to be regarded as 
a technique for political judgement, as 
a mode of interpreting and ascribing 
relevance to the indicators in the LSF 
Dashboard. It won’t always be the most 
appropriate technique, but occasionally 
it may be, especially where it persuades 
policymakers to make choices that enable 
people to lead the lives they have reason to 
value without determining the nature of 
those lives on people’s behalf. In this sense, 
the usefulness of the idea of the capability 
is primarily ex post, an exercise that we 
might yet undertake to imbue the LSF’s 
indicators with policy relevance.
The relative absence of capabilities 
from the Treasury’s discussion papers 
perhaps reflects the stage of the LSF’s 
development, in design rather than 
utilisation. As Conal Smith notes, 
philosophical differences over the nature 
of well-being have limited relevance to the 
choice of indicators: ‘The determinants of 
... the usefulness of the idea of the 
capability is primarily ex post, an 
exercise that we might yet undertake to 
imbue the LSF’s indicators with policy 
relevance.
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life satisfaction … turn out empirically to 
be largely the same things that are identified 
as important in a capabilities approach’ 
(Smith, 2018, p.17). However, looking 
beyond the choice of indicators, there are 
unresolved questions about how to 
interpret these indicators, to make sense of 
the data and to instil policy relevance. 
For example, a capability approach and 
a utilitarian approach are designed to draw 
quite different conclusions from the data, 
because each approach serves quite 
different normative goals. The former 
focuses on the expansion of substantive 
freedoms, whereas the latter focuses on the 
maximisation of utility. Even if we focus 
on the same data set, these approaches will 
generate different accounts of policy 
relevance and imply different sorts of 
policy. 
Consider, for example, the adaptation 
problem (Qizilbash, 2009). Sen notes that 
people who are disadvantaged – for 
example, by poverty or disability – may 
adapt to their circumstances and eventually 
become happy with their lot. Alternatively, 
people might acquire a ‘false consciousness’, 
where they are unwilling to acknowledge 
the injustice of their plight because of 
ideological commitments. Yet a subjective 
satisfaction with one’s situation does 
nothing to remedy the objective reality of 
disadvantage, nor does it absolve fellow 
citizens from obligations to ameliorate 
their situation, especially when 
disadvantage is arbitrary or unjust. Sen’s 
worry is that a metric of happiness, however, 
is blind to these considerations, because it 
only measures the stoicism of the 
disadvantaged and not the state of 
disadvantage that they’ve adapted to. A 
capability approach, by contrast, is 
concerned with creating opportunities to 
transcend this disadvantage, whether or 
not people have adapted to their condition, 
or acquired a false consciousness. The 
Fitoussi–Sen–Stiglitz commission includes 
the capability approach for this reason, 
because it identifies objective determinants 
of people’s well-being, ‘beyond their self-
reports and perceptions’ (Fitoussi, Sen and 
Stiglitz, 2009, p.151). As a result, while a 
capability perspective avoids one kind of 
paternalism in regards to determining how 
people’s lives ought to go, it is disposed to 
another kind of paternalism in regards to 
social arrangements. I will not argue a view 
here on whether this is good or bad, only 
note the different angle for policy relevance 
(for discussion, see Deneulin, 2002).
Through its diverse methodological 
inheritances, the LSF incorporates the 
informational materials for a range of 
different philosophical perspectives. It 
therefore can accommodate a range of 
interpretive possibilities for policymakers 
and others who wish to derive practical and 
policy relevance. This interpretive 
pluralism ought to be seen as a virtue, 
especially given that the framework will be 
utilised by different consecutive 
governments with different values and 
policy priorities. Sen has long argued for 
the superiority of his capability approach 
vis-à-vis other approaches that focus on 
utility (through happiness or satisfaction), 
or opulence (through income or 
commodity possession), or resources, or 
primary goods (Sen, 1993, p.48). But this 
was not to denounce these approaches as 
irrelevant; rather to argue that they were 
insufficient or subsidiary in the quest to 
analyse well-being and living standards. 
The capability is a particular way to make 
sense of the indicators for current and 
future well-being, which lends itself to a 
particular approach to policymaking, one 
that is far more concerned with enabling 
and empowering people to make their own 
choices than with delivering prescribed 
outcomes. 
This is the next frontier for the LSF: to 
bring greater clarity to how the LSF 
Dashboard might inform the political 
judgements of decision makers. Different 
normative and conceptual presumptions 
may lead to divergent interpretations of 
what the data implies. So far, the clearest 
example of thinking at this normative level 
is the protoype Mäori framework 
(O’Connell, Greenaway and the Tax 
Working Group Secretariat, 2018), which 
situates the four capitals within a tikanga 
f r a m e wo r k  o f  k a i t i a k i t a n g a 
(intergenerational/sustainabil i ty), 
whanaungatanga (connectedness), öhanga/
whairawa (prosperity) and manaakitanga 
(care/reciprocity). Each of these tikanga 
concepts is a way of making sense of the 
LSF indicators, of imbuing these with value 
and significance. Ideas like capability and 
utility operate at a similar level, as 
normative conceptions that instil the 
indicators with meaning. Greater 
conceptual clarity at this level will help the 
LSF to fulfil its promise in improving the 
practical judgements of policymakers.
1 The exception was the 11th discussion paper, on te ao Mäori 
perspectives (O’Connell, Greenaway and the Tax Working 
Group Secretariat, 2018, p.9). Sen is also discussed in 
a report that Treasury commissioned from Kötätä Insight 
(Smith, 2018, pp.10–11, p.17).
2 In any case, it would be difficult to follow Sen’s 
recommendations to the letter, because his framework 
is purposefully indeterminate and open-ended, in order 
to accommodate cultural particularities and democratic 
participation (Sen, 2004).
3 Campaigner Mike King refers to ‘national shame’ in his work 
to raise awareness of youth suicide in Aotearoa New Zealand 
(see Carville, 2017).
4 The LSF indicators for subjective well-being (‘general life 
satisfaction’ and ‘sense of purpose in one’s life’) are clearly 
self-regarding achievements. For life satisfaction, the New 
Zealand General Social Survey asks, ‘how do you feel about 
your life as a whole?’; for sense of purpose it asks, ‘to 
what extent do you feel the things you do in your life are 
worthwhile?’ (emphasis added; see Statistics New Zealand, 
2016).
5 I do not have the space here to properly address the idea of 
natural capital, not least because environmental issues are 
peripheral to Sen’s anthropocentric approach, but I direct the 
reader to germane discussions by Herman Daly, 2014, and 
Dalziel, Saunders and Saunders, 2018, pp.109–27.
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